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University of California, Berkeley
Hans-Werner Sinn has asked me to consider the con-
nections between globalization and the crisis. He did
so, I suspect, because I am an international economist
and there are international economics who will claim
that globalization is at the root of recent events. I hate
to disappoint, but the roots of the crisis, in my view,
lie elsewhere.
Fundamentally I see the crisis as the result of flawed
regulation and perverse incentives in financial mar-
kets. Regulators bought into the arguments of the reg-
ulated that financial institutions could safely operate
with a thinner capital cushion. They accepted the
premise that capital adequacy could be gauged on the
basis of the banks’ internal models and, where these
were absent, ratings of securities provided by com-
mercial credit rating agencies, notwithstanding the
incentives for the proprietors of the former to tweak
their models to minimize estimated risks and capital
requirements and the tendency for the latter, as invest-
ment advisors as well as issuers of ratings, to fall prey
to conflicts of interest. The regime that resulted was
capital poor and dangerously procyclical. Regulators
neglected liquidity, assuming away problems in whole-
sale money markets. Banks were allowed to hide risks
in conduits and structured investment vehicles and
window dress their balance sheets. Agency problems
flourished at each stage of the originate-and-distrib-
ute process. Mortgage brokers had no fiduciary
responsibility to homeowners. Banks not keeping a
participation in the complex derivative securities they
originated felt no responsibility to investors. The
structure of compensation encouraged bank execu-
tives to roll the dice, disregarding the implications of
their actions for the survival of the firm. And the reg-
ulators averted their eyes. If you want my summary of
the crisis, there you have it, in one paragraph.
Of course, this summary goes only an inch below the
surface. The deeper question is how these indefensible
circumstances were allowed to arise. Here I would cite
a powerful ideology of deregulation stretching back
to at least the Reagan-Thatcher years. I would cite
excessive confidence in quantitative methods of risk
management, Value at Risk, and of asset pricing, the
Black-Sholes model. I am not acquitting the academy,
in other words; we too fell prey to a powerful collec-
tive psychology. I would cite the intensification of
competition, with the Glass-Steagall restrictions start-
ing to crumble even before passage of the Gramm-
Bliley-Leach Act in 1999, encouraging banks to take
on additional leverage in their desperation to main-
tain normal returns. Finally, I would cite the con-
scious policy of the Bush Administration to starve the
regulators of human and financial resources. It is
hard to understand the pre-crisis behavior of the
Securities and Exchange Commission any other way.
There’s my summary of the deeper causes of the cri-
sis, again in one paragraph.
What about globalization, which is what I was in fact
asked to talk about? There are two connections. The
oblique connection is between globalization and the
competitive pressure that encouraged excessive risk
taking. Financial institutions stretched for risk and
gambled for survival as their profit margins were
squeezed by growing competition. The intensification
of competitive pressure reflected the increasing ability
of commercial and investment banks to infringe on
one another’s turf. It reflected the growing overlap
between banks and markets resulting from the dual
processes of securitization and disintermediation. But
another source of pressure was international competi-
tion, as finance was globalized, and in Europe in par-
ticular as the single market led to increasing in cross-
border competition. It is no coincidence that previ-
ously sleepy Landesbanken were so heavily invested in
toxic securities. I regard this as an indirect but impor-
tant consequence of financial globalization. 
The subsidiary connection is between global imbal-
ances and the asset bubble. As I have said, the match
that ignited the fire lay elsewhere, in lax regulation
and perverse incentives in financial markets. But glob-CESifo Forum 3/2010 21
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al imbalances poured fuel on the blames, leading to a
once-every-hundred-year firestorm. With significant
amounts of foreign capital (official capital in particu-
lar) flowing toward the United States, long-term inter-
est rates were lower than otherwise. This, of course, is
Mr. Greenspan’s own explanation for his now notori-
ous bond market ‘conundrum’. The low level of long-
rates encouraged households to assume additional
mortgage debt. It encouraged portfolio managers to
stretch for yield. It encouraged additional risk taking
by fund managers who found it increasingly difficult
to meet historical benchmarks.
The question is how much difference the capital flows
associated with global imbalances made for the
course of the crisis. I regard them as secondary fac-
tors – which is not to dismiss them but only to put
them in their place. Empirical studies put the impact
of foreign inflows on US treasury yields in 2004–2006
at 50 to 90 basis points (Warnock and Warnock 2009;
Craine and Martin 2009). The incentives created by
this fall in long rates no doubt encouraged the excess-
es that culminated in the crisis. Still, I would ask: how
different would the crisis have been had US long rates
been 50 or 70 or even 90 basis points higher? Not that
different, I would submit. Agency and regulatory
problems in financial markets, in conjunction with
what would have still been a relatively permissive
credit-market environment, would still have produced
a major bubble and then significant dislocations
when it burst.
What do I expect now in terms of regulatory reform?
I expect a drawn-out process. In the United States, we
have now passed the Frank-Dodd financial-reform
bill, and President Obama has signed it. But it now
falls to the Securities and Exchange Commission and
other agencies to draft the regulations required to
apply the law. The Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision has issued a proposal for countercyclical
capital buffers, but without indicating how counter-
cyclical or how big. The Basel Committee has indicat-
ed that capital requirements will be supplemented
with a simple leverage ratio, but it hasn’t specified the
ratio in question.
The difficulties of reaching agreement and coordinat-
ing regulation across countries suggest that there may
be pressure to make finance a more national affair.
Cross-border financial institutions will be tolerated
only where the risks they create can be safely man-
aged. And they can be managed only where there is
agreement on the risks requiring regulatory coopera-
tion. In practice, however, national officials continue
to disagree about the nature of the problem.
European officials see hedge funds and private equity
firms as significant threats to financial stability and
recommend clamping down on their operations. US
and UK officials disagree. The EU can go ahead and
apply strict regulation to hedge funds and private
equity firms, but the latter will then simply have an
incentive to relocate in the United States. EU officials
have indicated in this case that they will adopt regula-
tions limiting the ability of European residents to
invest in foreign-headquartered hedge funds and pri-
vate equity firms. This is as good – or bad, depending
on your view – an example of the dynamics of finan-
cial de-globalization as one can imagine.
And even where there is agreement, there are prob-
lems. There is consensus in both the United States and
Europe, for instance, on the need for an orderly reso-
lution mechanism as a third way, besides uncontrolled
bankruptcy and bailouts, for dealing with troubled
banks, bank holding companies, and nonbank finan-
cial firms. But many of our big banks, bank holding
companies and nonbank financial firms are interna-
tional, even global, in scope. The best efforts of the
Basel Committee’s Cross-Border Bank Resolution
Group notwithstanding, there has been little progress
in creating a global resolution mechanism.
If regulators are serious about creating an orderly res-
olution mechanism as an alternative to uncontrolled
bankruptcy and bailouts, they have no choice for the
time being but to do so at the national level. The geo-
graphical domain of big financial organizations will
therefore have to be made to more closely coincide
with the domain of the respective resolution authori-
ties. I would note that the Cross-Border Bank
Resolution Group recommends making large finan-
cial entities less complex and interconnected. By
implication it is pointing to the need to make them
less international.
Finally monetary policy and global imbalances: I sus-
pect that the immediate future will resemble the
immediate past to a greater extent than many
observers stipulate. To paraphrase a familiar quip
about the weather, everyone says that monetary poli-
cy should be reconceptualized to better deal with the
risks posed by asset bubbles, but no one does anything
about it. We have yet to move beyond statements of
principle. Specifically, there is no agreement on
whether central bankers can in fact identify bubbles,
how they should do so, on the circumstances underCESifo Forum 3/2010 22
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which they should lean against them, and on exactly
how hard they should lean. Absent answers to these
questions, I suspect that talk about adjusting mone-
tary policy in response to asset market conditions will
remain just that, talk.
Global imbalances will be smaller than they were at
their pre-crisis peak, because US investment rates will
be lower and because foreign finance for the US cur-
rent account will be less freely forthcoming. But they
are not going away. Surplus countries like China and
Germany need to raise their consumption, while the
United States needs to raise its saving in order to
make further progress in rebalancing the world econ-
omy. This, and not the exchange rate, should be the
focus of the rebalancing debate: what can be done to
accelerate the rate of growth in consumption in China
and Germany, and what can be done to accelerate the
rise in saving in the United States. Chinese house-
holds, when they consume more, consume dispropor-
tionately Chinese stuff. US households, when the con-
sume less, consume disproportionately less US stuff.
So the price of Chinese stuff will have to rise relative
to the price of US stuff. This is just another way of
saying that the real exchange rate will have to adjust.
It will have to adjust either through inflation in China
and deflation in the United States, or else through a
change in the nominal exchange rate. Personally, I
prefer achieving the requisite change in the real
exchange rate by allowing the nominal exchange rate
to adjust.
This way of putting things has three implications.
(There is a fourth implication, for the internal dynam-
ics of the euro area, but I will resist the temptation to
go there.) First, adjustment of the exchange rate goes
together with the adjustment of spending levels: it is
not the catalyst for them. But even if it is not the cat-
alyst, exchange rate adjustment is needed to clear
markets in general equilibrium.
Second, adjustment of the exchange rate will be slow
and gradual rather than abrupt and discontinuous
because the evolution of US and Chinese spending
patterns will be slow and gradual rather than abrupt
and discontinuous. It will take time for Chinese
households to change their habits. It will take time for
the Chinese government to build the social safety net
that those households require to feel comfortable with
lower levels of precautionary saving. It will take time
to strengthen the governance of big state enterprises
so that they pay out more of their earnings in wages,
fringe benefits and dividends. And it will take time,
like it or not, to narrow the gaping budget deficits that
are now the main cause of low national savings rates
in the United States, household savings rates already
having risen.
Finally, because these adjustments will take time, the
elimination of global imbalances will take time. They
will be with us for years to come. In the short run,
they are likely to widen out again as US investment
recovers. That’s bad news. The good news, such as it
is, is that global imbalances were not the prime mover
in the recent crisis.
Thank you very much.
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PANEL
The European Editor of The Economist, John Peet,
chaired the first panel and expressed praise for the
organisers for the timing of the conference: after the
Icelandic volcano had settled down and shortly before
the British general elections, and only days after the
Greek crisis had come to a head. 
Martin Zeil, Bavarian State Minister of Economic
Affairs, Infrastructure, Transport and Technology,
pointed to the need for precise instruments for
European fiscal policy with rules of the game that
apply equally to all members and effective control sys-
tems in the eurozone. With regard to the criticism
aimed at the German business model, he observed
that the problem is not Germany’s competitiveness
but the loss of competitiveness in other European
countries. Germany for its part must strengthen its
domestic economy with structural reforms on the sup-
ply side that lead to sustainable growth from which all
euro zone members would profit. Zeil also argued that
there is no alternative to globalisation: protectionism
is an illusion, not a solution. “Open markets are the
life line of Europe, Germany and Bavaria”.
For Lady Barbara Judge of the UK Energy Authority
the role of globalisation in the financial crisis was
more subtle than normally assumed. “It wasn’t justCESifo Forum 3/2010 23
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that you could buy Californian mortgages in
Germany but it was that everybody was watching it”.
Everybody watched the lines in front of Northern
Rock on television that helped build virtual lines of
depositors that wanted their money back. This kind
of globalisation turned the financial crisis into a pan-
demic; the dramatic effect of the media contributed to
turning a local banking crisis into a global crisis. The
global supply chain then exacerbated the banking cri-
sis, turning it into an economic crisis. Fortunately
there was no repeat of the Great Depression because
the international community acted immediately, deci-
sively and in a coordinated way, putting in place sig-
nificant fiscal and monetary stimulus and restoring
confidence quickly and effectively. “The recession was
painful but not killing”. Globalisation lifted millions
out of poverty over the past 30 years and its advance
cannot be stopped. What the financial crisis shows is
that we were ill-prepared to manage our global econ-
omy; “putting in place the necessary mechanisms to
run the global economy is not going to be easy” but
there is no other option. We need regulation that is
global and we must avoid a situation where regulato-
ry arbitrage prevails. 
Martin Blessing, Chairman of the Board of Manag-
ing Directors of Commerzbank, pointed out that
globalisation and the free movement of capital did
not cause the financial crisis but helped it spread
around the globe. Financial markets must remain
international, but better regulations are needed in
line with the 4 points made earlier by President
Horst Köhler. He was not in agreement, however,
with a tax on international financial transactions as
this is far too complex. “We need to think of other
instruments that are easier to implement”. On the
euro crisis, Blessing stressed that Europe needs to
move towards a more politically and fiscally inte-
grated system. The euro was created as a force for
economic and political integration. “Without politi-
cal integration Europe will become more and more
unimportant globally”.
Theo Waigl, the German finance minister during the
negotiations for the Stability Pact and the single cur-
rency, observed that globalisation is an irreversible
process. The risk of contagion is higher, to be sure, but
the ‘smoothing mechanisms’ are also stronger. The
lessons to be learned from the crisis are that freedom
needs order, i.e. financial regulation. We also need a
‘convincing consolidation strategy’ to follow on the
effective but very expensive action to respond to the
crisis. Can this work? It did in the Clinton adminis-
tration, which focused on consolidation, bringing
about a budget surplus and new jobs. With regard to
the euro, Waigl stressed that the euro is now stronger
than originally anticipated. Inflation is under control,
the ECB is performing well. And Germany has bene-
fited from this. With regard to Greece there was no
choice but to put it under budget control, and fortu-
nately the experts of the IMF are also involved. For
states with excessive deficits, the temporary withdraw-
al of voting privileges would be a better disciplinary
instrument than monetary fines. 
In the discussion Brian Carney of The Wall Street
Journal asked what the legal ramifications of going
against the no-bail-out clause of the Maastricht
Treaty are. Barry Eichegreen replied, “legal niceties
notwithstanding” we have to deal with the facts
that are there, and the courts will certainly see the
need to have dealt constructively with the Greek
problem. Theo Waigl asserted that although the
euro countries are not obligated to assume the
debts of others of its members, they are not pre-
vented from helping these countries – ‘under strict
conditions’. This stance would also stand in the
courts, he was convinced. 
What is needed more than fiscal integration, accord-
ing to Hans-Werner Sinn, is debt control. Martin
Blessing replied that the present debt-control mech-
anisms in the euro area have not been effective.
Stricter controls would of course infringe on nation-
al sovereignty and this may be necessary for further
integration. Without the mechanisms to enforce fis-
cal discipline, he fears that the euro will not work.
Martin Zeil pointed out that Germany contributed
to weakening the Maastricht rules itself and this
“has now caught up with us”. Axel Weber empha-
sised that the stability-oriented policy in the euro
area has been working well for 10 years. The problem
is the implementation. “We focused too much on the
deficit and not on the debt. We failed to consolidate
in good times”. The lesson for the future is to use the
recovery to tighten budgets and to move to sustain-
able budgetary positions. 
John Peet brought up the criticism of German policy
expressed by French Minister Christine Lagarde that
Germany is causing a problem for its partners by run-
ning a very large current-account surplus, forcing oth-
ers in the euro zone to run current-account deficits.
Theo Waigl stressed that Germany, faced with the
huge costs of unification, chose a moderate wage pol-
icy and it cannot be faulted for this. Germany canCESifo Forum 3/2010 24
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indeed improve its investment structure, especially
with regard to research and education, but calling for
higher wages to increase purchasing power is not very
good advice. Martin Zeil pointed out that Germany
cannot accept measures that would weaken its com-
petitiveness on international markets. Axel Weber
added that the high savings rate in Germany is moti-
vated by its citizen’s precautionary attitudes with
regard to future security. In the United States, with its
higher population growth rates, ordinary people tend
to invest more in the stock market. 